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PENSABILITY UNDER THE NEW JERSEY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

AC-r-White v. Atlantic City Press, 64 N.J. 128, 313 A.2d 197
(1973).
On the morning of April 13, 1971, John B. White left his residence
in Atlantic City and drove toward his employer's place of business in
Pleasantville, New Jersey.' His duties included loading newspapers
into his automobile and delivering them at scattered stops along a
20-25 mile route.2 While still close to his home, he picked up two
hitchhikers who requested a ride to a bus station. There was evidence
that the drive to the bus station required a detour of several blocks
from the route that White normally followed to get to work. There
was a further showing, however, that even by taking the alternate route,
which passed by the bus station, he would lose no appreciable time.3
While the car was stopped at a red light, the hitchhikers "returned
[White's] favor by committing acts of felonious assault and robbery
upon him."4 White subsequently filed for compensation benefits pursuant to the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act. 5
Atlantic City Press, White's employer, denied liability on three
grounds: (1) There was no employment relationship; (2) even if such
relationship were found to exist, the coming-and-going rule precluded
1 White v. Atlantic City Press, 64 N.J. 128, 131, 313 A.2d 197, 198 (1973).
2 Id. at 131, 313 A.2d at 199.
3 Id. The petitioner testified that he had picked up hitchhikers on prior occasions but
"had never encountered or known of harmful incidents." Id.
4 Id. at 130, 313 A.2d at 198. White received injuries for which he was hospitalized,
but returned to work a week later. Id. at 131, 313 A.2d at 199.
5 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959) provides:
When employer and employee shall by agreement, either express or implied,
as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of this article compensation for
personal injuries to, or for the death of, such employee by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment shall be made by the employer without
regard to the negligence of the employer, according to the schedule contained in
sections 34:15-12 and 34:15-13 of this title in all cases except when the injury or
death is intentionally self-inflicted, or when intoxication is the natural and proximate cause of injury, and the burden of the proof of such fact shall be upon the
employer.
(emphasis added).
The Act, which abolished the common law negligence actions and defenses in the
employment situation, is a form of social insurance which
extends its "beneficent provisions" alike to the "weak and sick" as to the "strong
and able" so long as those of either class come under its provisions and sustain a
compensable accident.
Swift & Co. v. Von Volkum, 131 N.J.L. 83, 85, 34 A.2d 897, 898 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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recovery; and (3) picking up a hitchhiker relieved the employer of
6
liability even if the other criteria were satisfied.
The judge of compensation found for White on the first two
grounds, but held for his employer on the third.7 The petition was
dismissed and the decision was affirmed by the appellate division in
an unreported per curiam opinion.8 The New Jersey supreme court
subsequently granted certification. 9
Justice Pashman, speaking for the court in White v. Atlantic City
Press,10 accepted the findings of the compensation judge concerning
the existence of an employment relationship.1 1 He further found that
in the instant situation "the use of the car was both a necessity as well
as an established practice," and it was used in connection with White's
employment. 12 Thus, the case fell within the ambit of an exception to
the coming-and-going rule which recognizes recovery when the nature
of the employment dictates the use of an automobile for the benefit
of both the employer and the employee. 13 Since compensability under
6 White v. Atlantic City Press, 64 N.J. 128, 130, 313 A.2d 197, 198 (1973).
7 Id. The trial judge relied upon Beh v. Breeze Corp., 2 N.J. 279, 66 A.2d 156 (1949),
as the basis for his holding. White v. Atlantic City Press, 64 N.J. at 130, 313 A.2d at 198.
Beh held that hitchhiking was "a source of danger to life, limb and property" and. as such
did not arise out of the employment. 2 N.J. at 284, 66 A.2d at 158.
8 White v. Atlantic City Press, No. A-269971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., April 24, 1973).
9 White v. Atlantic City Press, 63 N.J. 497, 308 A.2d 662 (1973). In White's petition for
certification, he contended:
Discrimination against persons who pick up hitchhikers is a psycological [sic]
phenomenon attributable in part to many judges whose higher social status inhibits their acceptance of -the fact that hitchhiking is a common and lawful
method of travel.
Petitioner's Brief for Certification at 1,White v. Atlantic City Press, 64 N.J. 128, 313 A.2d
197 (1973).
10 64 N.J. 128, 313 A.2d 197 (1973).
11 Id. at 133, 313 A.2d at 200. The test utilized by the court was whether the conclusion "could reasonably have been reached," considering all credible evidence in the
record and giving due regard and weight to the findings of the trial judge below. Id. at
133-34, 313 A.2d at 200. See De Angelo v. Alsan Masons Inc., 122 N.J. Super. 88, 89-90, 299
A.2d 90, 91 (App. Div.), aff'd, 62 N.J. 581, 303 A.2d 883 (1973).
12 64 N.J. at 135, 313 A.2d at 201. The court found it inconceivable that White, as a
newspaper deliveryman, could effectuate his deliveries in any other reasonable manner than
by using his own automobile. It concluded that to require the use of two cars to avoid
the harshness of the coming and going rule would be "preposterous." Id. See Begley v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 114 N.J. Super. 537, 543, 277 A.2d 422, 426 (Union
County Ct. 1971), cert. denied, 61 N.J. 155, 293 A.2d 385 (1972).
13 64 N.J. at 135, 313 A.2d at 201. The court stated:
"[R]ight to compensation rests upon the principle that whenever an employee,
because of contract, necessity, express permission or established and accepted
practice, uses his car regularly or frequently in connection with his employment
and for the employer's benefit, he is within the scope of his employment when
transporting the car to and from the place of employment in order to have it
available for such use."
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this exception attaches at the moment the employee enters the vehicle,
recovery was permitted under~the Workmen's Compensation Act. 14
The third issue raised by Atlantic City Press presented the court
with an opportunity to reevaluate the hitchhiker doctrine in New
Jersey. The court held that the act of picking up hitchhikers is no
longer a disqualified deviation from the employment in all cases. 15
Rather, it retains a sufficient work-connection for the act to "arise out
of" such employment.' 6
The history of the hitchhiker doctrine reveals a conflict among
some of the jurisdictions that have considered the issue. One of the
earliest cases to allow compensation was the 1936 decision of the Nebraska supreme court in Goodwin v. Omaha Printing Co. 17 Goodwin
was employed as a salesman, and while driving to a business appointment in Columbus, Ohio, he allowed a hitchhiker to ride with him.
The passenger, after. requesting to be let out, produced a gun and
ordered Goodwin to leave the automobile. As Goodwin was comply8
ing, the hitchhiker fatally shot him.'
An action was instituted by Goodwin's widow pursuant to the
workmen's compensation law of Nebraska. 19 Following an analysis of
Id. (quoting from Begley v. International Terminal Operating Co., 114 N.J. Super. 537,
543, 277 A.2d 422, 426 (Union County Ct. 1971), cert. denied, 61 N.J. 155, 293 A.2d 385
(1972)).
The coming-and-going rule has historically been a bar to employee recovery. In order
for compensability to have been found, injury must have taken place on the employer's
premises. Accidents which occurred while going to or coming from work were not compensable since they neither arose out of nor occurred in the course of employment. The
harshness of this rule soon became apparent and over the years many exceptions have been
found, including the one used by the court in White. See generally Note, The Going and
Coming Rule, 41 N.D.L. REv. 185 (1964). In White, Justice Pashman stated: "It is axiomatic that exceptions to the rule have been so numerous that they have almost swallowed
the rule." 64 N.J. at 134, 313 A.2d at 200; Hammond v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
56 N.J. 7, 12, 264 A.2d 204, 206 (1970). This was first suggested in Horovitz, Workmen's
Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41 NEB. L. REv. 1, 51 (1961). The
author noted that there are at least 19 exceptions to the rule. Id. at 50-51.
14 See 64 N.J. at 134, 313 A.2d at 200.
15 Id. at 141, 313 A.2d at 204. The court placed emphasis on the following facts: The
deviation was only a few blocks, an alternative route was available, and the deviation was
minor in comparison with other fact situations where recovery had been allowed. Id. See
Rainear v. C.J. Rainear Co., 63 N.J. 276, 307 A.2d 72 (1973), and the cases cited therein
for a list of fact situations to which the court was alluding.
16 64 N.J. at 140, 313'A.2d at 203-04.
17 131 Neb. 212, 267 N.W. 419 (1936).
18 Id. at 213, 267 N.W. at 420. The record disclosed that Goodwin used his own automobile in his employment and he was reimbursed on a per mile basis. Id. at 212, 267 N.W.
at 420.
19 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-101 (1968) provides compensation
[wlhen personal injury is caused to an employee by accident or occupational
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the so-called street-risk cases, 20 in which the Nebraska courts had allowed compensation, the court stated:
While it is true that highway robbery and murder are sometimes
committed on the highways, yet it cannot be said that such acts are
to ride in the car is
so common that the inviting of a "hitchhiker"
21
anything more than a charitable act.
The court reasoned that even if Goodwin had not picked up the hitch'22
hiker, he may "have been shot and robbed anyway.
New Jersey, however, took a contrary position in Beh v. Breeze
Corp. 23 The supreme court in Beh denied compensation to a claimant
who had been robbed and assaulted by a hitchhiker. The plaintiff was
a salesman temporarily working out of his company's Detroit office.
He was required to use his own car and was reimbursed on a per mile
basis. While driving from Chicago, Illinois, to Muskegon, Michigan, he
picked up a hitchhiker during a snow storm. When they stopped for a
meal at a roadside diner, the hitchhiker noticed that Beh was carrying
a large sum of money. After lunch the rider took out a pistol and pro-

24
ceeded to rob Beh. Beh was shot and killed while attempting to resist.

The court found that picking up a hitchhiker was neither necessary
for the accomplishment of decedent's employment, nor an express duty
of such employment. 25 Additionally, it found that the nature of Beh's
disease, arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, of which the
actual or lawful imputed negligence of the employer is a natural and proximate
cause ....
20 The street-risk doctrine is most commonly applied to highway robbery situations.
It has been referred to as the "common application of the general rule granting compensation when the assault arises out of a risk associated with the situs of the work." 1 A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.11(c), at 3-127 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as A. LARSON]. See, e.g., Coster v. Thompson Hotel Co., 102 Neb. 585, 168 N.W. 191
(1918).
The court in Goodwin found assault by a hitchhiker to be included within the streetrisk doctrine and further found that "[r]obbery is generally planned and committed not
because of but regardless of the acts and wishes of the victim." 131 Neb. at 216, 267 N.W.
at 422.
21 131 Neb. at 216, 267 N.W. at 421-22.
22 Id., 267 N.W. at 422.
23 2 N.J. 279, 66 A.2d 156 (1949).
24 Id. at 281-82, 66 A.2d at 157. The court conceded that the incident arose "in the
course of" the employment and thus the analysis focused upon whether it arose "out of"
the employment. Id. at 282-83, 66 A.2d at 157. The court noted that neither Beh's
employer nor his employment contract had either forbidden him or encouraged him to
pick up hitchhikers. Id. at 282, 66 A.2d at 157.
25 Id. at 283, 66 A.2d at 158. The court stated:
[T]he peril was clearly separable from his line of duty; the nature of his duties
did not expose him to danger except through his own independent act; there was
no causal connection between the accident and the conditions attending the transactions of the employer's business.
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employment did not expose him to the danger of street robbery and
denied the existence of a causal connection between the accident and
such employment. 26 Since "[t]he pick-up was purely a charitable incident for the accommodation of the hitch-hiker," the court reasoned that
it was outside of the employment and could27not be viewed as benefiting
the employer either directly or indirectly.
The supreme court holding in Beh reversed a contrary result
reached a year earlier by the former supreme court which had considered the same case. 28 The former court viewed Beh as analogous to
Foley v. Home Rubber Co., 29 in which a salesman traveling on the
Lusitania during World War I was killed when the ship was hit by a
torpedo. 30 The former court reasoned that in both instances the injury
Id. This seems to have been a total rejection of the positional-risk concept that was
adopted four years later in Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953). Using the
"but for" test it could have been argued that the duties of his employment did in fact
expose him to the dangers of the highway. While the court recognized this, it was explicitly rejected. 2 N.J. at 284, 66 A.2d at 158. See notes 41-48 infra and accompanying text.
26 2 N.J. at 283, 66 A.2d at 158. The Beh court reached a contrary position to that
taken by the Nebraska supreme court in Goodwin. The court in Beh held that "It]he
accident was not directly attributable to a risk of the highway." Id. Larson places the act
of picking up hitchhikers within the street-risk doctrine. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20,
§ 11.11(c), at 3-127 to 3-129. This approach is similar to that taken by the court in Goodwin.
27 2 N.J. at 283, 66 A.2d at 158. The court believed it to be "common knowledge that
accommodating hitch-hikers is a source of danger to life, limb and property," and it therefore felt that picking up riders could in no way advance the business of the employer.
Id. at 283-84, 66 A.2d at 158.
28 137 N.J.L. 431, 60 A.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1948). When Beh reached the appellate level
in 1948, the court of errors and appeals was the highest court in the state and the supreme
court had intermediate appellate jurisdiction. The supreme court was composed of a
chief justice and eight associate justices pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution of 1844.
The supreme court justices additionally sat on the court of errors and appeals along with
a chancellor and six specially appointed members. McConnell, A Brief History of the New
Jersey Courts, 7 N.J. DIGEST 349, 352-53 (West 1954).
Beh reached the court of last resort in 1949. On September 15, 1948, the Judicial
Article of the Constitution of 1947 became effective and provided for a supreme court
consisting of a chief justice and six associate justices. The newly created supreme court
was established as the highest court in the state and the appellate division of the superior
court replaced the former supreme court as the intermediate appellate tribunal. Id. at
355-56.
29 89 N.J.L. 474, 99 A. 624 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 91 N.J.L. 323, 102 A. 1053 (Ct. Err. & App.
1917).
The court in Foley noted that the employer had knowledge of the risks involved, and
thus if Foley was killed by a collision or shipboard fire there would be no question of
compensability. 89 N.J.L, at 478, 99 A. at 626.
Of interest is the court's analysis distinguishing the case before it from Hulley v.
Moosbrugger, 88 N.J.L. 161, 95 A. 1007 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915). See 89 N.J.L. at 477, 99
A.2d at 625. For a discussion of Hulley v. Moosbrugger, see notes 52-55 infra and
accompanying text.
80 89 N.J.L. at 475, 99 A.2d 624-25. Foley was returning on the Lusitania from a
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was one of the risks of travel and, as such, "arose out of" the employment. 1
The Beh court did not agree with the court below and found Foley
32
clearly distinguishable:
The granting of rides to unknown people seeking them for unknown reasons is not a risk of the highway but a self imposed risk
brought about by the motorist himself.33
Thus, the act of picking up a hitchhiker was deemed to be a disqualified
deviation and not sufficiently work-connected to "arise out of" the
employment.
In determining whether an injury "arises out of" the employment,
34
the New Jersey courts have not resorted to any strict legal formula,
but have instead adhered to a flexible, fact-oriented approach.33 An injury is deemed to "arise out of" the employment when the risk "might
have been contemplated by a reasonable person, when entering the
employment, as incidental to it." 'm6 A causal connection between the
business trip to London and evidence showed that his employer had knowledge of the trip
as well as the means of transportation utilized. The court in finding that the accident
"arose out of" the employment placed emphasis on the fact that the employer knew of
the risk. Id. at 481, 99 A. at 627.
31 137 N.J.L. at 433, 60 A.2d at 274. The court supported this contention by citing
the traditional broad construction given to the compensation statute. Id. See Belyus v.
Wilkinson, Gaddis & Co., 115 N.J.L. 43, 178 A. 181 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 92, 182
A. 873 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
32 2 NJ. at 284, 66 A.2d at 158.
33 Id. at 283-84, 66 A.2d at 158.
34 Tocd v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., 28 N.J. 582, 587, 147 A.2d 783, 785 (1959). See, e.g.,
Green v. DeFuria, 19 N.J. 290, 296, 116 A.2d 19, 22 (1955); Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J.
8, 13, 97 A.2d 593, 595 (1953); Saintsing v. Steinbach Co., 1 N.J. Super. 259, 264, 64 A.2d
99, 101 (App. Div. 1949) (by implication).
35 Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., 28 N.J. 582, 587, 147 A.2d 783, 785 (1959). The court
in Tocci recognized that
[t]he continued sweeping generality of the statutory language and its judicial
definition suggest the conscientious endeavor to maintain a liberally just line
between those accidental injuries which may be said to have had some work
connection and those . . . unrelated to the employment.
Id.
38 Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N.J.L. 72, 78, 86 A. 458, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1913). See also Geltman
v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 446-47, 25 A.2d 894, 896 (Ct. Err. & App.
1942). The "arising out of" requirement is enunciated in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (1959)
which provides in pertinent part:
When personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment ... he shall receive compensation therefor from
his employer ....
This phrase was borrowed from the English statute, The Workmen's Compensation
Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 1(1) which stated:
If in any employment to which this Act applies personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his
employer shall . . . pay compensation ....
See also 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 6.00, at 3-1.
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employment and the accident must be shown in order to satisfy the
"arising out of" requirement. 7 To establish this causal connection,
it must appear that the employment contributed in some manner to the
injury, and that the risk of harm was reasonably incidental to the
work to be performed.38 A risk has been determined to be sufficiently
incidental to the employment when it is either directly connected with
a workman's duties in fulfilling his employment, or is indirectly connected to an employment of a special nature.3 9 In the developmental
stages of this concept, causation was defined solely in terms of quantitative risk and compensation was disallowed in cases where an injury
40
was not logically connected to the employment.
The hardships and inequities caused by the inherent limitations of
this approach led the New Jersey supreme court to adopt the positional-risk, or "but for" doctrine. 41 This theory supports compensation
in
situations in which the only connection of the employment with the
injury is that its obligations placed the employee in the particular
place at the particular time when he was injured by some neutral
to the claimant nor
force, meaning by "neutral" neither personal
42
distinctly associated with the employment.
An example of the use of this doctrine is Gargiulo v. Gargiulo,43 where
an employee was struck in the eye by a stray arrow while burning trash
Causation is defined in the traditional tort sense of legal or proximate cause:
To be the legal cause of an accident, the employment must be a cause in fact or
actual cause thereof, and also either be a direct cause . . . or, if there be intervening causes, they must not be of such a nature as to constitute superseding
causes.
F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 213, at 432 (1933) (footnote omitted).
38 See Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., 28 N.J. 582, 586-87, 147 A.2d 783, 785 (1959);
Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N.J.L. 72, 78-79, 86 A. 458, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
39 Belyus v. Wilkinson, Gaddis & Co., 115 N.J.L. 43, 47, 178 A. 181, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1935),
af'd, 116 N.J.L. 92, 182 A. 873 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936). See also Note, Arising "out of" and
"in the Course of" the Employment Under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act,
20 RuTGERS L. Rxv. 599, 601 (1966).
40 The courts denied compensation in early cases particularly when "skylarking" was
involved. E.g., Savage v. Otis Elevator Co., 136 N.J.L. 419, 56 A.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (air
hose sprayed on worker's face); Budrevie v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 135 N.J.L. 46, 50
A.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (horseplay in freight elevator); Staubach v. Cities Serv. Oil Co.,
127 N.J.L. 577, 24 A.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (throwing gasoline near employee working
with a torch). Compensation was further denied in situations where the injury was caused
by an unknown assailant and for no motive. E.g., Bobertz v. Board of Educ., 135 N.J.L.
555, 52 A.2d 827 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); Giles v. W.E. Beverage Corp., 133 N.J.L. 137, 43
A.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Schmoll v. Weisbrod & Hess Brewing Co., 89 N.J.L. 150, 97 A.
723 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
4' Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8, 12, 97 A.2d 593, 595 (1953).
42 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 6.40, at 3-4. The author comments that very few
jurisdictions are willing to accept the full implications of this doctrine. Id.
43 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953).
37
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on the property of his employer. The arrow was shot by a child and
the injury was concededly accidental 44 The court did not feel constrained by the traditional requirement of direct connection and found
that although there must be causation between the accident and the
employment, foreseeability of the injury was not a viable criterion. 45
Instead, utilizing the positional-risk test, the court reasoned:
But for the compliance with his allotted work directive requiring
his presence at the particular time 46and place in question, the injury would not have been inflicted.
It concluded that any injury suffered by an employee while performing
duties at the direct order of an employer is a sufficient contributing
47
cause to satisfy the work-connection requirement.
The ascendency of the positional-risk doctrine showed a practical
awareness by the supreme court of the fact that an employee is as
vulnerable to uncontemplated and uncontrolled accidents as he is to
the normal hazards of his employment. 48 A logical extension of this
realistic liberalism was a reevaluation of the "skylarking" or horseplay
situations.

49

New Jersey was one of the first jurisdictions to deny compensation
44 Id. at 10, 97 A.2d at 594. The petitioner could not tell "where the arrow came
from and heard only a cry, 'Look out,' before he was struck." As a result of his injuries
he lost an eye. Id.
45 Id. at 12, 97 A.2d at 595.
46 Id. at 13, 97 A.2d at 596. The employment brought Gargiulo "unwittingly into
the line of fire of the arrow, where he would not have been except for his employment."
Id.
47 See id.
48 See id. One author has suggested that Gargiulo defines the outside limitations of
positional-risk in New Jersey. Malone, Workmen's Compensation, 8 RurGmts L. REv. 97
(1953).
A strong argument can be made that while the worker is engaged in actively
answering the orders of his employer he should be protected against virtually any
risk that brings about an accident. Casuistry here would seem to side with injustice.
Id. at 101. Case law since Gargiulo neither accepts nor rejects the author's contention.
49 One author has defined horseplay as
the colloquial term referring to sportive and playful acts often used legalistically
to describe the conduct of employees who skylark or prank, doing injury to themselves or to others.
Comment, Horseplay by Employees, 15 CLEv.-MAi. L. REV. 104, 104 (1966) (footnote omitted). The early American decisions followed the English cases which had denied compensation to the innocent, non-participating victims. See, e.g., Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorkshire
Ry., [1902] 2 LB. 178. American case law denied such compensation until Judge Cardozo, in
his landmark decision of Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711
(1920), distinguished between the aggressor-participant and the innocent victim in allowing
recovery. Id. at 471, 128 N.E. at 711.
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to employees engaged in horseplay 0 and recognized no distinction between the aggressor-participant and the innocent victim. 51 In Hulley
v. Moosbrugger,52 the court of errors and appeals, relying primarily
on English precedent, 53 strictly construed the "arising out of" employment section of the compensation act and held that horseplay was
outside the scope and intent of that provision." Later New Jersey
decisions reaffirmed the position taken in Hulley and consistently denied compensation.5"
Despite the trend in other jurisdictions towards awarding recovery
to the non-participating victim,56 it was not until 1955, in the landmark
case of Secor v. Penn Service Garage,57 that the New Jersey supreme
court adopted the majority view. The plaintiff in Secor was a 22-year-old
gas station attendant. While performing his services, some fuel overflowed onto his clothing.58 After being asked by one of his employers
50 Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N.J.L. 161, 95 A. 1007 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915). At that
time only Massachusetts had case law even analogous to the issue. See McNicol's Case, 215
Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913). In McNicol's Case, compensation was awarded to an employee who died as a result of injuries sustained from an assault by an intoxicated coworker. Id. at 500, 102 N.E. at 698. The court in Hulley found that the facts in McNicol's
Case did not constitute "skylarking" and noted that there was no precedent in New Jersey
which allowed compensation in horseplay situations. 88 N.J.L. at 165, 95 A. at 1009.
61 One court has emphatically declared:
We are of opinion that an employer is not liable under the Workmen's Compensation act ... to make compensation for injury to an employe which was the
result of horse-play or sky-larking, so called, whether the injured or deceased party
instigated the occurrence or took no part in it ....
Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N.J.L. 161, 169, 95 A. 1007, 1010 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915)
(citation omitted).
52 88 N.J.L. 161, 95 A. 1007 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915).
55 Hulley has been criticized for blindly following English precedent. See Note, 29
YALE LJ. 669 n.20 (1920).
54 88 N.J.L. at 169, 95 A. at 1010. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. The
court emphasized that the assault by the co-workers was "the doing of a negligent act as
an individual tort-feasor, for which his employer was not responsible." 88 N.J.L. at 168,
95 A. at 1010.
55 See, e.g., Mountain Ice Co. v. McNeil, 91 N.J.L. 528, 103 A. 184 (Ct. Err. & App.
1918) (ice cream salesman's skull fractured during scuffle with co-worker); Savage v. Otis
Elevator Co., 136 N.J.L. 419, 56 A.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (air hose sprayed in worker's
face); Budrevie v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 135 N.J.L. 46, 50 A.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
(horseplay in freight elevator); Staubach v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 127 N.J.L. 577, 24 A.2d 193
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (throwing gasoline near employee working with a torch); Powers v.
Y.M.C.A. of Bayonne, 17 N.J. Misc. 261, 8 A.2d 189 (Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1939) (pin
boy injured by another who sportfully threw a bowling ball at him).
56 See 1 A. LAPSON, supra note 20, § 23.10 n.1, at 5-102 to 5-103 and cases cited therein.
See generally Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41
ILm. L. REV. 311, 315-25 (1946).
57 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d 12 (1955). Secor is discussed in Note, 22 NACCA L.J. 175, 180
(1958).
58 19 N.J. at 316, 117 A.2d at 12.
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to change his gasoline-soaked attire, he retorted that "he wasn't afraid
of that stuff" and proved his point by lighting a match near his trousers.
He was engulfed by the ensuing flames and was severely injured. 59
Although the facts were in dispute, the court reasoned that even if
the evidence was to be construed most favorably to the employer, and
Secor's actions were in "mock bravado," the deviation was minor and
there was sufficient work-connection to warrant compensation. 0 The
court gave credence to "the compelling principles underlying the
modern authorities" to lend support to its result. 6x Identifying the
existence of minor deviations in almost every employment situation,
the court stated:
An employee is not an automaton, and, even when he is highly
efficient, he will to some extent deviate from the uninterrupted performance of his work. Such deviation, if it be considered minor in
the light of the particular time, place and circumstances, is realistically viewed by both the employer and the employee as a normal
incidence of the employment relation and ought62not in this day
be viewed as legally breaching the course thereof.
While the clearly articulated holding in Secor seemed to have
judicially settled the issue of horseplay in New Jersey, the legislature
felt it important to amend the Workmen's Compensation Act to guarantee this result-at least to non-participating victims. The amendatory
measure included specific provisions to compensate the innocent victims of horseplay, but omitted any mention of the participants, thus
creating some doubt as to whether the latter would be statutorily barred
from recovery.6 3
59 Id. at 317, 117 A.2d at 13.
60 The court in Secor distinguished between momentary impulsive deviations and
conscious deliberate excursions. Id. at 324, 117 A.2d at 16. The latter are represented by
the "curiosity" cases exemplified by Robertson v. Express Container Corp., 13 N.J. 342, 99
A.2d 649 (1953). In Robertson, the petitioner was eating her lunch on the roof of the
building where she was working when she climbed to a higher elevation to see if there
was still smoke from a recent fire at Port Newark. Id. at 344, 99 A.2d at 650. She fell
through a skylight and was seriously injured. In the resulting compensation action, the
court found that she was not engaged in any work connected activity
but was in the course of a promenade for purposes entirely unrelated to her
employment over a separate portion of the roof, where, it is clear, she had never
been before.
Id. at 348, 99 A.2d 652.
61 19 N.J. at 324, 117 A.2d at 16.
62

Id.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.1 (1959) provides:
An accident to an employee causing his injury or death, suffered while engaged in his employment but resulting from horseplay or skylarking on the part
of a fellow employee, not instigated or taken part in by the employee who suffers
the accident, shall be construed to have arisen out of and in the course of the
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The supreme court addressed this problem in McKenzie v. Brixite
Manufacturing Co.,64 where the petitioner was employed as a granule
mixer. Johnson, a fellow worker, was busy cleaning an empty barrel
with a hot scraper "when petitioner walked by and playfully touched
[him] between his buttocks."6 5 Startled by the unexpected contact,
Johnson instinctively raised his arms, striking and injuring the petitioner. The employer was aware of other such sportive touching incidents among his employees. 66
The employer contended that the Workmen's Compensation Act 7
barred a claim for compensation by an aggressor-participant. It argued
that since the legislature specifically granted compensation to injured
non-participants of horseplay and omitted any reference to either in6
stigators or participants, recovery should be barred under the statute. 8
This argument proved unpersuasive to the court, which reasoned that
the adoption of the respondent's contentions would in effect constitute
a backward step in the progress achieved in the liberalization of the
workmen's compensation law. 6 1 It concluded that minor deviations
"'attributable to normal human tendencies' " are a commercial reality.70 The legislature, by failing to mention the participants of horseplay, merely "focused [on] the employee intended to benefit by this
amendment" and did not intend to exclude other classes such as participants. 71 The court found no reason to invoke the maxim, expressio
72
unius est exclusio alterius, and thus allowed recovery.
employment of such employee and shall be compensable under the act hereby
supplemented accordingly.
(footnote omitted).
64 34 N.J. 1,166 A.2d 753 (1961). This case gives an excellent review of the history of
skylarking in New Jersey. Id. at 3-5, 166 A.2d at 755.
65 Id. at 3. 166 A.2d at 754. There was evidence that "'[e]very man on the job knows
that Walter Johnson is goosy; but when he is playing with a bucket of hot asphalt they
stay away from him.'" Id. at 7, 166 A.2d at 756.
66 Id.

See note 63 supra for text of the statute.
34 N.J. at 8, 166 A.2d at 757. For the text of the statute, see note 6 supra. The
court noted that the legislature was fully aware of the case law which had discussed
skylarking in situations in which the employer had knowledge. Since the amendment made
no reference to this, however, the court would not do so by implication. 34 N.J. at 8, 166
A.2d at 757.
69 34 N.J. at 8, 166 A.2d at 757. The court agreed with the county court that to hold
otherwise
"would in effect be turning back the clock of progress and nullify the liberal interpretation of remedial legislation as intended by the Legislature."
Id. (quoting from the unreported county court opinion).
70 Id. at 5, 166 A.2d at 755 (quoting from Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315,
320-21, 117 A.2d 12, 15 (1955)).
71 34 N.J. at 8, 166 A.2d at 757. Speaking of the legislature, the court stated:
67
68
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An important element in McKenzie and earlier "skylarking" cases

78
was proof of the employer's acquiescence in the sportive activity. This

element of proof, however, was eliminated in Diaz v. Newark Industrial
Spraying, Inc.74 In Diaz, the plaintiff was hosing down certain frames

on his employer's premises. He playfully squirted a co-worker who
warned that if it happened again, Diaz "would receive the same treatment.''75 After Diaz repeated his mischievous conduct, the irritated
co-worker retaliated by throwing what he thought to be a pail of water
at him. The liquid was in fact lacquer thinner which was ignited almost
immediately by an open flame under a nearby tank. Diaz was severely
burned.76
The action was defended on the ground that Diaz failed to prove
acquiescence of such activity on the part of the employer and that this
infirmity was fatal to Diaz's cause. 77 The court deemed the question of
the employer's acquiescence to be immaterial.78 Rather, it decided that
the case requires the application of a realistic view of reasonable
with peohuman reactions to working conditions and associations
79
ple encountered in the course of employment.
Applying this standard, the court held that Diaz's minor deviation was
sufficiently work-connected to be compensable.8 0
It limited its amendatory statute to that narrow field and we cannot find any
legislative intent to change the original act any further than as expressly declared.
Id.
72 34 N.J. at 8, 166 A.2d at 757. See Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 360 (1960),
wherein the court stated:
The maxim at best is a mere aid to interpretation. Perhaps more accurately, it
usually serves to describe a result rather than to assist in reaching it. The final
question is whether in a given context an express provision with respect to a
portion of an area reveals by implication a decision with respect to the remainder.
The issue is one of intention. The answer resides in the common sense of the
situation.
id. at 539, 166 A.2d at 365. See H. BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 50-54 (8th ed. 1882). Cf. Gangemi
v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 11, 134 A.2d 1, 6 (1957).
73 See 34 N.J. at 3, 166 A.2d at 754. The significance of the employer's acquiescence
was recognized, although not factually accepted, as early as 1918 in Mountain Ice Co. v.
McNeil, 91 N.J.L. 528, 528-29, 103 A. 184, 185 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918).
74 35 N.J. 588, 174 A.2d 478 (1961).
75 Id. at 589, 174 A.2d at 478. There was evidence that Diaz knew little or no English
and did not understand the warnings. Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. To support this theory the employer relied on McKenzie v. Brixite Mfg. Co., 34
N.J. 1, 166 A.2d 753 (1961).
78 35 N.J. at 590, 174 A.2d at 479. The court held that the facts of the case "do not
encompass the type of 'skylarking' which bars recovery." Id. (emphasis added). It is difficult
after reviewing the case law in this area to conceive of the non-compensable type of skylarking to which the court is alluding.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 593, 174 A.2d at 481. The court felt that "[t]he act of the claimant in each
case was humanly impulsive and relatively minor." Id.
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A review of the case law since Beh reveals a pattern of increasing
liberalism in the court's attitude toward compensability. In Gargiulo,
the court eroded the traditional rule which required an accident to be
directly connected with the employment by adopting the positionalrisk doctrine. 8 ' The Secor court allowed recovery for injuries sustained
by an employee, even though his acts were "impulsive" and far less than
8 2 The McKenzie court, recognizing the social importance of
prudent.
Secor's result, embraced the rationale of that decision and broadly construed an amendment to the Act in order to find compensation for an
aggressor-participant of horseplay.83 In Diaz, the court, again relying
on the Secor rationale, delivered the final blow to Hulley and its predecessors by rejecting the need for proof of the employer's acquiescence
in "skylarking" situations.8 4 Secor and its aftermath contrast sharply
with the harsh position taken in Beh with reference to the picking up
of hitchhikers. White v. Atlantic City Press presented the court with
the opportunity to continue the liberalization of the past two decades
by applying it to the hitchhiker doctrine.
After finding that an employment relationship did in fact exist
between White and the Atlantic City Press 8 and that the coming-andgoing rule did not bar recovery under the Act, 6 Justice Pashman considered the crucial question of whether picking up a hitchhiker was
sufficiently work-connected to satisfy the "arising out of" requirement
necessary to allow compensability for an injury.8 7 The court recognized
that Beh was "in sharp divergence from the philosophy" espoused by
the courts since that decision with reference to the "arising out of"
requirement.8 " It noted that in Beh the plaintiff was denied recovery
because of the "voluntary action of the employee beyond [that] in
contemplation by the employer at the time of hiring."8' 9 In other words,
compensation was denied because the employee's act of allowing a
hitchhiker to ride was not reasonably foreseeable. However, the court
stated that
foreseeability of the incidence of a particular kind of injury to an
employee has always been regarded as immaterial in the rationale
of compensation law.90
81 See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text.
82 See notes 57-63 supra and accompanying text.
83 See notes 64-72 supra and accompanying text.
84 See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text.
85 64 N.J. at 134, 313 A.2d at 200. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
88 64 N.J. at 135, 313 A.2d at 201. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
87 64 N.J. at 137, 313 A.2d at 202. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 20, § 6.50, at 3-8.
88 64 N.J. at 137, 313 A.2d at 202. In fact, the court believed that the "gravamen of
Beh" was the judicial enlargement of the "arising out of" concept. Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. E.g., Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 319, 117 A.2d 12, 14 (1955).
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It further noted that foreseeability was associated with tort law and
fault principles, and not with workmen's compensation law. In the law
of workmen's compensation, work-connection-not foreseeability-is
the main issue to be considered.
An examination of the Beh court's rationale revealed that it considered the "self-imposed risk" of picking up hitchhikers to be a disqualified deviation from the employment sufficient to establish a lack
of work-connection. The court in White refuted this contention finding
it contrary to the no-fault principle basic to workmen's compensation
law.9 ' The Workmen's Compensation Act abolished the common law
defense of contributory negligence and limits fault "solely to the
92
categories of intentional self-infliction of harm and intoxication."
Therefore, since White's actions did not fall within either of these
categories, the court sought to determine whether the act of picking up
hitchhikers was a "'risk that grows out of or is connected with what a
workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service.' ,,03
Considering that question, Justice Pashman stated that
the risk is not beyond the purview of employment connection
merely because it is heightened by an act of the employee otherwise within the course of the employment, which might be described as "foolhardy," "negligent," or "foolish"...94
The court used Secor and Diaz as examples of cases in which compensation was given to individuals who were somewhat less than prudent in
their activities. 95 It further noted that accidents are not to be viewed
as taking place in a vacuum. Rather, one must look to " 'the entire
nature of the employment, including the risks of human associations
and failings and conditions inseparable from the specific work.' "96 If
White's deviation from the employment was found not to be substantial, compensation would lie "regardless of how one might assess such
97
conduct in terms of prudence, judgment, wisdom or human frailty.''
91 64 N.J. at 137, 313 A.2d at 202.
92 Id. The language of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959) further provides that in order
for fault to lie, intoxication must be "the natural and proximate cause of injury." Case
law has held that the intoxication must be the sole cause. 64 N.J. at 137 n.l, 313 A.2d at
202. E.g., Olivera v. Hatco Chem. Co., 55 N.J. Super. 336, 350, 150 A.2d 781, 788-89 (App.
Div.), cert. denied, 30 N.J. 557, 154 A.2d 449 (1959).
93 64 N.J. at 137, 313 A.2d at 202 (quoting from Belyus v. Wilkinson, Gaddis & Co.,
115 N.J.L 43, 47, 178'A. 181, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 92, 182 A. 873 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1936)).
94 64 N.J. at 138, 313 A.2d at 202. See Green v. DeFuria, 19 N.J. 290, 297, 116 A.2d

19, 23 (1955).
95 See notes 57-61 and 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
96 64 N.J. at 139, 313 A.2d at 203 (quoting from Diaz v. Newark Indus. Spraying, Inc.,
35 N.J. 588, 591, 174 A.2d 478, 479 (1961)).
97 64 N.J. at 140, 313 A.2d at 203.
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The court considered whether White's actions satisfied the "reasonable human reaction" test utilized in Diaz.98 The act of picking up
the hitchhikers was thought by the court to be "an act which occurs
countless times on the streets and highways, and in the vast majority
of instances without harm. ' 99 Relying in part upon the decision of
the Nebraska supreme court in Goodwin, the court decided that the
detour was not "a serious deviation in terms of comparison with other
fact situations we have held not to be fatal to recovery."' 100 Thus, since
the employer was the motivating force behind White's presence on the
highway at the time of the occurrence, thereby subjecting him to the
risk, the court held that "there was work-connection sufficient to render
11
the ensuing injuries such as arose out of the employment.''
The Workmen's Compensation Act precludes any litigation which
is grounded on common law negligence principles in the employment
setting. As a result, the employee is no longer expected to be at all times
a "reasonable man" or model worker who always demonstrates the utmost care and diligence on the job. Instead, the court appears to recognize the concept of a "reasonable human man" who is allowed mo10 2
mentary lapses from reasonable prudence.
The decision in White is to be lauded for its subscription to this
philosophy and its expansion of the "arising out of" concept. 0 3 The
98 Id. at 139, 313 A.2d at 203.
99 Id. The court said that the prudence of the act was not at issue for

the reasonably expectable range of conduct.. . can run the entire gamut from the
grossly careless, imprudent, or foolhardy, to the opposite of those characteristics.
Id.
100 64 N.J. at 141, 313 A.2d at 204. For a list of the cases to which the court alludes,
see Rainear v. C.J. Rainear Co., 63 N.J. 276, 307 A.2d 72 (1973).
The court cautioned, however, that the decision does not reflect approval of hitchhiking, 64 N.J. at 140 n.2, 313 A.2d at 204. Hitchhiking is prohibited by N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-59 (1973) which provides:
No person shall stand in a highway for the purpose of or while soliciting a
ride from the operator of any vehicle other than an omnibus or a street car.
101 64 N.J. at 140, 313 A.2d at 204 (footnote omitted).
102 It has been suggested that if the court had held for White's employer, it would
have reverted to a philosophy which would sanction
hand[ing] the worker copies of Prosser on Torts, the Motor Vehicle Code, and the
Criminal Code and then to admonish the intimidated employee: "If you are
injured because of violating any of the rules and prescripts of these authoritative
books, you will irretrievably have departed from your employment and you will
then have to call upon your health and accident insurer for benefits or rattle a
tin cup seeking statutory alms or a seat in the soup kitchens of the welfare rolls."
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Newsletter, at 95 (March, 1974).
103 One professor contends that many of the New Jersey compensation courts
have been increasingly taking a view that the two tests posed by compensation
statutes of "arising out" of and "in the course of" are to be treated as disjunctive
rather than conjunctive tests. This implies that a finding that either test is
satisfied will allow compensation without inquiry being made as to satisfaction of
the other test.
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decision shows a frank recognition of the true purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the realistic goals that any social insurance
plan must strive to achieve. New Jersey has been a leader in the fair
and just interpretation of workmen's compensation issues, and the
White decision can only be viewed as another addition to this highly
commendable record.
David J. Gherlone, Jr.
Letter from Professor James Boskey, Seton Hall University School of Law, to author, May
8, 1974, on file at the Seton Hall Law Review.

